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Abstract
Optimization models generally aim for efficiency by maximizing total benefit or minimizing cost.
Yet a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is an important element of many practical decisions. We
propose a principled and practical method for balancing these two criteria in an optimization model.
Following a critical assessment of existing schemes, we define a set of social welfare functions (SWFs)
that combine Rawlsian leximax fairness and utilitarianism and overcome some of the weaknesses of
previous approaches. In particular, we regulate the equity/efficiency trade-off with a single parameter
that has a meaningful interpretation in practical contexts. We formulate the SWFs using mixed integer
constraints and sequentially maximize them subject to constraints that define the problem at hand.
After providing practical step-by-step instructions for implementation, we demonstrate the method on
problems of realistic size involving healthcare resource allocation and disaster preparation. The solution
times are modest, ranging from a fraction of a second to 18 seconds for a given value of the trade-off
parameter.
1 Introduction
Fairness is an important consideration across a wide range of optimization models. It can be a central issue
in health care provision, disaster planning, workload allocation, public facility location, telecommunication
network management, traffic signal timing, and many other contexts. While it is normally straightforward
to formulate an objective function that reflects efficiency or cost, it is not obvious how to express fairness
in mathematical form. When both fairness and efficiency are desired, as is typical in practice, there is the
additional challenge of mathematically integrating them in a tractable model.
We undertake in this paper to develop a practical and yet principled approach to balancing fairness and
efficiency that can be implemented in a mixed integer/linear programming (MILP) model. We present the
underlying theory as well as practical guidelines for implementation. In particular, we provide step-by-step
instructions for incorporating our formulation into an existing model (Section 9).
Our guiding intuition is that a scheme that balances equity and efficiency should give some degree of
priority to parties in greatest need, but not at unlimited cost. When a natural disaster brings down the
electric power grid, crisis managers may dispatch crews to urban areas first in order to restore power to
more households quickly, thus maximizing efficiency. Yet this may cause rural areas to experience very long
blackouts, which could be seen as unfair. A more satisfactory solution might give some amount of priority
to rural customers, but without imposing too much harm on the population as a whole. Similarly, traffic
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signal timing that minimizes total delay may result in impracticably long wait times for traffic on minor
streets that cross a main thoroughfare. Again a balance between equity and efficiency may be desirable.
The issue can be especially acute in health care. Expensive treatments or research programs that prolong
the life of a relatively few gravely ill patients may divert funds from preventive health measures that would
spare thousands the suffering brought by less serious diseases. The obvious question in such cases is how to
regulate the trade-off between fairness and efficiency. We propose an approach that is arguably more easily
interpreted and implemented in a practical optimization model than other schemes that have been proposed.
While there are many possible measures of fairness, we choose a criterion based ultimately on John
Rawls’ concept of justice-as-fairness (Rawls 1999). One consequence of the Rawlsian analysis is his famous
difference principle, which states roughly that a fair distribution of resources is one that maximizes the
welfare of the worst-off. Rawls defends the principle with a social contract argument that can be plausibly
extended to lexicographic maximization. That is, the welfare of the worst-off is first maximized subject to
resource constraints, whereupon the welfare of the second worst-off is maximized while holding that of the
worst-off fixed, and so forth. We choose a lexicographic formulation because it provides a more nuanced
measure of fairness than the maximin criterion, and because the Rawlsian perspective has been defended
by closely reasoned philosophical arguments in a vast literature (Richardson and Weithman 1999, Freeman
2003). Our aim is to combine this fairness criterion with an efficiency measure in a principled and practical
fashion.
The Rawlsian argument goes roughly as follows. Let’s suppose that all concerned parties adopt an
agreed-upon social policy in an original position behind a “veil of ignorance” as to their identity. It must
be a policy that all parties can rationally accept upon learning who they are. Rawls argues that no rational
decision maker will accept a policy in which she is the least advantaged, unless she would have been even
worse off under any other policy. A fair outcome should therefore maximize the welfare of the worst-off. The
argument can be employed recursively to defend a leximax criterion. Rawls intended his principle to apply
only to the design of social institutions, and to pertain only to the distribution of “primary goods,” which
are goods that any rational person would want. Yet it can be plausibly extended to distributive justice in
general, particularly if it is appropriately combined with an efficiency criterion.
Fairness can be incorporated into an optimization model by using a social welfare function (SWF) as the
objective function. The SWF is a function of the utility levels allocated to affected parties, where utility can
be defined as profit, negative cost, or any other measure of benefit that suits the context. The SWF assigns
higher values to more desirable utility distributions, and the optimization problem is to maximize the SWF
subject to problem constraints. The goal is to develop a SWF that reflects both fairness and efficiency.
Our contribution is threefold. We begin by assessing, from the perspective of an optimization modeler,
several existing approaches to balancing fairness and efficiency in a SWF. We then propose a scheme that not
only has a tractable MILP formulation but, in our view, overcomes several weaknesses of existing methods.
In particular, we address a problem that nearly all of them share: a failure to parameterize the trade-off
between efficiency and fairness in a fashion that can be understood and applied in practice. Finally, we
conduct a thorough analysis of the mathematical properties of the formulation proposed here.
One modeling scheme that offers a potentially appealing approach to the fairness/efficiency trade-off is
that of Hooker and Williams (2012). Their SWF contains a single parameter ∆ that has the same units
as utility and can be related naturally to the problem at hand. The value of ∆ is chosen so that parties
whose utility is within ∆ of the lowest are seen as sufficiently disadvantaged to deserve priority. This yields
a utilitarian criterion when ∆ = 0 and a pure maximin criterion for sufficiently large ∆, with intermediate
values of ∆ injecting the fairness criterion to varying degrees.
Despite its attractive features, the Hooker-Williams scheme has shortcomings. One is that the actual
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utility levels of disadvantaged parties other than the very worst-off have no bearing on social welfare. The
SWF imposes no penalty for reducing their utility levels to that of the worst-off. This leads to solutions that
may not adequately account for equity considerations in real applications.
We address this problem by combining efficiency with a lexicographic criterion rather than a maximin
criterion. This allows the utility levels of all disadvantaged parties to factor into social welfare. It also results
in a more sophisticated interpretation of the trade-off parameter ∆. However, it poses the difficult challenge
of designing an SWF that yields a practical optimization model. We meet the challenge by maximizing
a series of SWFs rather than a single function. We show how to incorporate each SWF as the objective
function of the given problem using MILP constraints. We then obtain a socially optimal solution by solving
the resulting sequence of optimization models.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 with an assessment of the primary existing
schemes for combining equity and efficiency in a SWF. These include convex and other combinations of utility
with such equity criteria as the Gini cofficient and the Rawlsian difference principle. We examine α-fairness,
along with proportional fairness (also known as a the Nash bargaining solution) as a special case, followed
by an evaluation of the the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We then take up the Hooker-Williams
scheme as well as a proposal for combining utility with a lexicographic criterion.
In an effort to address some of the shortcomings of these methods, we next develop our approach to
combining leximax fairness and utilitarianism. An earlier version of this scheme is briefly described in a
conference paper (Chen and Hooker 2020). In Section 3 below, we define SWFs that can be sequentially
maximized, subject to the constraints of the given problem, to obtain a socially optimal solution for a
specified tradeoff parameter ∆. We study the mathematical properties of these SWFs in Section 4 and
describe the sequential optimization procedure more precisely in Section 5. A key element of our proposal is
a set of practical MILP models for these optimization problems, which we describe and validate in Section 6.
This is followed in Section 7 with a family of valid inequalities that can be added to tighten the models.
Real applications often require utility distribution to groups rather than individuals, such as organizations,
regions, or demographic groups. We therefore generalize our method in Section 8 to deal with groups having
specified sizes.
Section 9 provides step-by-step practical guidelines for incorporating our modeling approach into an
existing optimization model. Practitioners may wish to skip directly to this section, which is intended to
be as self-contained as possible. In Section 10, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our approach
by applying it to a healthcare resource allocation problem and an emergency preparedness problem. The
former allows us to compare results with those reported by Hooker and Williams (2012) on the same problem.
The latter is a shelter location and assignment problem of realistic size. We find that our approach yields
reasonable and nuanced socially optimal solutions for both problems, with computation times ranging from
a fraction of a second to 18 seconds for a given ∆. The paper wraps up with concluding remarks and two
Appendices containing proofs of theorems that were not proved in the body of the paper.
2 Schemes for Combining Equity and Efficiency
We begin by evaluating some of the primary alternatives to our proposed method for balancing equity and
efficiency in an optimization model. For a comprehensive review of equity/efficiency modeling, we refer the
reader to Karsu and Morton (2015), who also survey a wide range of applications in which equity measures
are used and describe research in the mathematical foundations of equity modeling.
We view each scheme for integrating equity and efficiency as proposing a social welfare function (SWF)
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F (u), where u = (u1, . . . , un) and ui is the amount of utility allocated to party i. The function F (u)
appears as the objective function in an optimization model. The model contains resource limitations and
other constraints imposed by the problem, and these define a feasible set of utility vectors u. The SWF is
then maximized over this feasible set.
2.1 Fairness as Equality
One approach to combining fairness and efficiency is to use equality as a surrogate for fairness. This poses
two questions: which measure of equality is appropriate, and how should it be combined with efficiency in
an SWF? We address the latter question in the next section.
While it is clear what it means for utilities to be equal, it is much less clear how to measure departures from
equality. A number of metrics have been proposed, including relative mean deviation, variance, coefficient
of variation, McLoone index, Gini coefficient, Atkinson index, Hoover index, and the Theil index. Many
of these are discussed and analyzed by Cowell (2000) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2011). By far the most
popular is the Gini coefficient, which is regularly used to gauge income and wealth inequality. The Gini
coefficient measures the relative mean difference between all pairs of utilities and can be defined
G(u) =
∑
i<j
|ui − uj |
n
∑
i
ui
(1)
Perfect equality corresponds to a Gini coefficient of 0, and perfect inequality (in which all the utility is
allocated to one party) to a coefficient of 1. One attractive property of the Gini coefficient is that it satisfies
the Pigou-Dalton condition, often viewed as a desirable characteristic for inequality measures. It states that
transferring utility from a better-off party to a worse-off party should increase (or at least not decrease)
social welfare. A practical issue with the Gini coefficient and most other inequality metrics, however, is
their nonlinearity, which could complicate solution of an optimization model. If one wishes to minimize (1)
alone, the problem can be linearized using linear-fractional programming (Charnes and Cooper 1962), but
nonlinearity remains an issue when (1) is combined with an efficiency measure.
A fundamental weakness of any equality-based surrogate for fairness is that equality is not the same
concept as fairness (Frankfurt 2015). While excessive inequality is undesirable in a number of contexts
(Scanlon 2003), minimizing inequality is arguably not synonymous with maximizing fairness, because it gives
no particular priority to the less advantaged (Parfit 1997). It can equate a utility-neutral rearrangement of
wealth that promotes equality among millionaires with a utility-neutral rearrangement that improves the lot
of the very poor. It is therefore at odds with the basic intuition we have adopted for this study, namely that
fairness implies giving priority to those who need it most.
2.2 Convex Combinations
We now move to the question of how a fairness measure can be combined with an efficiency measure. The
most obvious alternative is to use a convex combination:
F (u) = (1− λ)
∑
i
ui + λΦ(u)
where Φ(u) is a fairness measure. A perennial problem with convex combinations is that it is difficult to
interpret λ, particularly when Φ(u) is measured in units other than utility. For example, if we use the
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Gini coefficient G(u) as a measure of inequity, then we must combine utility with a dimensionless quantity
Φ(u) = 1−G(u). Larger values of λ give greater weight to equality, but in a practical situation it is unclear
how to attribute any meaning to a chosen value of λ.
Eisenhandler and Tzur (2019) use a product rather than a convex combination of utility and 1−G(u),
which nicely reduces to an SWF that is easily linearized:
F (u) =
∑
i
ui − 1
n
∑
i<j
|uj − ui|
Yet we now have a convex combination of total utility and another equality metric (one that is proportional
to the negative mean absolute difference); in particular, it is a convex combination in which λ = 1/2. This
may be reasonable for the intended application, but one may ask why this particular value of λ is suitable,
and whether other values should be used in other contexts. Aside from this are the general issues raised by
using equality as a surrogate for fairness.
One can combine utility with the Rawlsian maximin criterion by using the convex combination
F (u) = (1− λ)
∑
i
ui + λmin
i
{ui} (2)
This, at least, combines quantities that are measured in the same units. Yet it is again unclear how to
select a suitable value of λ. Note that if we index utilities so that u1 ≤ · · · ≤ un, (2) is simply a weighted
sum u1 + (1 − λ)
∑
i>1 ui that gives somewhat more weight to the lowest utility. Yet how much more is
appropriate? One can refine criterion (2) by giving gradually decreasing weights w1 > w2 > · · · > wn to the
utilities in an SWF of the form
F (u) =
∑
i
wiui (3)
Yet this only complicates the task of assigning weights. In addition, since we do not know how to index the
utilities by size in advance, we have the difficult modeling challenge of ensuring that weight wi is assigned
to the ith smallest utility.
Finally, one might attempt to combine efficiency with a leximax criterion by using suitable weights wi
in (3). Ogryczak and Sliwinski (2006) show which weights accomplish this for a purely leximax objective,
but the weights tend to vary enormously in size, which introduces numerical instability. In addition, it is
unclear how to adjust the weights so as to incorporate efficiency into the objective function.
2.3 α-Fairness and Proportional Fairness
A much-discussed family of SWFs known as α-fairness have the form
Fα(u) =

1
1− α
∑
i
u1−αi for α ≥ 0, α 6= 1∑
i
log(ui) for α = 1
These SWFs form a continuum that stretches from a utilitarian criterion (α = 0) to a maximin criterion as
α → ∞. They can therefore be seen as blending equity and efficiency, with larger values of α implying a
greater emphasis on equity. Lan et al. (2010) provide an axiomatic treatment of α-fairness in the context of
network resource allocation, and Bertsimas et al. (2012) study worst-case equity/efficiency trade-offs implied
by this criterion.
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Figure 1: (a) Nash bargaining solution for two players. (b) Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution for two
players. In both cases, the default position is the origin.
The parameter α can be interpreted as quantifying the equity/efficiency trade-off, because utility uj must
be reduced by (uj/ui)
α units to compensate for a unit increase in ui (< uj) while maintaining constant social
welfare. This gives priority to less-advantaged parties, as we desire, with α indicating how much priority. In
particular, the fact that (uj/ui)
α > 1 when ui < uj implies that Fα(u) satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition
for all α. Yet it is not obvious what kind of trade-off, and therefore what value of α, is appropriate for a
given application. The underlying difficulty is that there is no apparent interpretation of α independent of
its role in the SWF. There is also the computational impediment that Fα(u) is nonlinear.
A well-known special case of α-fairness arises when α = 1. This results in proportional fairness, often
measured by the product Πiui rather than its logarithm
∑
i log(ui). Maximizing proportional fairness yields
the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950), which should not be confused with the Nash equilibrium of
game theory. It corresponds to selecting a point u in the feasible set that maximizes the volume of the
hyperrectangle with opposite corners at u and the origin. This is illustrated in Fig. 1(a), where each point
on the plot represents the utility outcomes for two parties that result from some distribution of resources.
The set of feasible utility vectors is the area under the curve. The Nash bargaining solution is the black
dot, which is the feasible point that maximizes the area of the shaded rectangle. Proportional fairness is
frequently used in engineering, such as for bandwidth allocation in telecommunication networks and traffic
signal timing.
Proportional fairness has axiomatic and bargaining-based derivations that might be seen as justifying the
parameter setting α = 1. For example, Nash (1950) showed that his bargaining solution for two persons is
implied by a set of axioms for utility theory. Harsanyi (1977), Rubinstein (1982), and Binmore et al. (1986)
showed that the Nash solution is the (asymptotic) outcome of certain rational bargaining procedures. Yet
the axiomatic derivation relies on a strong axiom of cardinal noncomparability across parties that is central
to the proof. The axiom assumes that the ranking of utility vectors is invariant under affine transformations
of the form φi(ui) = βiui + γi, which arguably rules out the kind of utility comparisons we need in order
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to assess fairness (Hooker 2013). Furthermore, the bargaining theories assume that the parties begin with
a default utility allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) on which they fall back if bargaining fails, as illustrated by our
medical example in Section 10.1. The proportional fairness SWF then becomes F (u) = Πi(ui − di). An
unfair starting point d could lead to an unfair outcome even under a rational bargaining procedure, and
even if we grant that rational bargaining from a fair starting point necessarily yields a fair outcome. This
weakens the bargaining argument for the fairness of the Nash solution in general.
2.4 Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining
The Kalai-Smorodinsky (K-S) bargaining solution was proposed as an alternative to the Nash bargaining
solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975). It provides players the largest possible increase in utility relative
to the maximum increase they could obtain if other players were disregarded, subject to the condition that
the relative increase is the same for all players. Increases in utility are measured with respect to the default
utility allocation. This scheme is sometimes described as minimizing each player’s relative concession.
One motivation for the K-S criterion is that it maximizes total utility while maintaining fairness for all
players, where fairness takes into account the fact that allocating utility to some players is more costly than
to others. The approach is defended by Thompson (1994) and is arguably consistent with the contractarian
ethical philosophy developed by Gautier (1983).
Mathematically, the objective is to find the largest scalar β such that u = (1− β)d+ βumax is a feasible
utility vector, where each umaxi is the maximum of ui over all feasible utility vectors u. The bargaining
solution is the vector u that maximizes β. Figure 1(b) illustrates the idea for two players when the default
position d is the origin. The K-S solution (black dot) is the highest point at which the diagonal line intersects
the feasible set.
Axiomatic justifications are given for the K-S solution by Kalai and Smorodinsky as well as by Thompson,
but they again rely on a strong axiom of cardinal noncomparability. A bargaining justification might be
given by arguing that it is rational for each player to minimize relative concession, and repeated rounds of
bargaining will lead under suitable conditions to an equilibrium in which their relative concessions are equal
and minimized.
Yet the K-S criterion leads to an anomalous situation when one player’s utility gain is very expensive and
therefore requires very large utility transfers from the other players (Hooker 2013). This forces the overall
utility gain to be very small in the K-S solution when much greater utility gains are possible. In the extreme
case where one player’s utility cannot be increased at all unless other utilities are held constant, the K-S
solution obliges all players to settle for the default position with no increase in utility. That is, if umaxi > di
and max{ui | u ∈ S, uj > 0 for j 6= i} = di, where S is the feasible set, then the K-S solution is β = 0 and
u = d. This wastes all potential increases in total utility simply because one player cannot benefit when
others benefit. This phenomenon does not occur in the other schemes considered here, in which there are
socially optimal solutions that increase utility in a scenario of this kind.
Finally, there is apparently no generalization of the K-S scheme, analogous to α-fairness and Nash
bargaining, that allows parameterization of the equity/efficiency trade-off.
2.5 Combining Utilitarian and Rawlsian Criteria
We now examine two additional methods in the literature for combining utility with a maximin or leximax
criterion. One is the Hooker-Williams SWF described earlier, which combines utility with a maximin cri-
terion. It was inspired by a 2-person SWF put forward by Williams and Cookson (2000). The indifference
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Figure 2: Piecewise linear social welfare contours for 2 persons.
curves (contours) of the SWF are illustrated in Fig. 2. The function is utilitarian when |u1 − u2| ≥ ∆ and
represents a maximin criterion otherwise. Specifically,
F (u1, u2) =
{
u1 + u2, if |u1 − u2| ≥ ∆
2 min{u1, u2}+ ∆, otherwise
The maximin criterion would ordinarily be min{u1, u2}, but it is modified here to obtain continuous contours
as one moves from the utilitarian to the maximin objective.
The feasible set in Fig. 2 is again the portion of the nonnegative quadrant under the curve. In a medical
context, for example, it represents all feasible health outcomes that are within the resource budget. The
shape of the curve indicates that when patient 1’s health reaches a certain point, further improvement
requires extraordinary sacrifice by patient 2 due to the transfer of resources. The utilitarian solution (black
dot in the figure) might therefore be viewed as preferable to the maximin solution (small open circle) and
in fact yields slightly more social welfare as indicated by the contours.
Hooker and Williams (2012) extend this social welfare function to n persons as follows. They observe
that it can be written
F (u1, u2) = ∆ + 2u〈1〉 + (u1 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ + (u2 − u〈1〉 −∆)+
where (α)+ = max{0, α}, and where we adopt the convention that (u〈1〉, . . . , u〈n〉) is the tuple (u1, . . . , un)
arranged in non-decreasing order. This function is readily generalized to n persons:
F1(u) = (n− 1)∆ + nu〈1〉 +
n∑
i=1
(ui − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (4)
We refer to the function as F1 because it will be the first in a series of functions F1, . . . , Fn we define later.
It may be more intuitive to rewrite (4) as
F1(u) =
(
t(u)− 1)∆ + t(u)∑
i=1
u〈1〉 +
n∑
i=t(u)+1
u〈i〉
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Figure 3: Contours of F1(0, u2, u3). The function is constant in the shaded region.
where t(u) is defined so that u〈1〉, . . . , u〈t(u)〉 are within ∆ of u〈1〉; that is, u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 ≤ ∆ if and only if
i ≤ t(u). We will refer to utilities u〈1〉, . . . , u〈t(u)〉 as being in the fair region and utilities u〈t(u)+1〉, . . . , u〈n〉
as being in the utilitarian region. The function F1(u) therefore has the effect of summing all the utilities, but
with the proviso that utilities in the fair region are counted as equal to u〈1〉. Thus the relatively disadvantaged
individuals (those within ∆ of the worst-off) are treated in solidarity with the worst-off, in the sense that
their lot is equated with that of the worst-off. The term (t(u) − 1)∆ is added to ensure continuity of the
function.
The parameter ∆ therefore has an interpretation that can be described independently of its role in the
SWF. Namely, any party with utility within ∆ of the lowest is viewed as disadvantaged and deserving
of special consideration. The SWF then defines the special consideration to be an identification of the
disadvantaged party with the worst-off party, which is given disproportionate weight in the summation of
utilities—namely, weight equal to the number of utilities within ∆ of the lowest.
Gerdessen et al. (2018) make some interesting observations regarding properties of the SWF (4). In
particular, the solutions obtained by varying ∆ need not all lie on the Pareto frontier defined by the convex
combination (2) of utilitarian and maximin objectives. This is in fact to be expected, because the convex
combination balances total utility with only the welfare of the worst-off party, while (4) balances total utility
with the welfare of all disadvantaged parties.
A problem with (4), however, is that the actual utility levels of the disadvantaged parties, other than
that of the very worst-off, have no effect on the value of the SWF. This is illustrated in the 3-person example
of Fig. 3, which shows the contours of F (u1, u2, u3) with ∆ = 3 and u1 fixed to zero. The SWF is constant
in the shaded region, meaning that the utilities allocated to persons 2 and 3 have no effect on social welfare
as measured by F1(u), so long as they remain in the fair region. As a result, there are infinitely many utility
vectors that maximize social welfare, some of which differ greatly with respect to utilities in the fair region.
One can add a tie-breaking term (u2 + u3) to the social welfare function, where  > 0 is small, so as to
maximize utility as a secondary objective. Yet this still does not account for equity considerations within
the fair region.
To obtain a SWF that is sensitive to the actual utility levels of all the disadvantaged parties, one might
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combine utility with a leximax criterion rather than a maximin criterion. McElfresh and Dickerson (2018)
propose one method of doing so in the context of kidney exchange. Their method is related to the Hooker-
Williams approach, but it relies on the assumption that the parties can be given a preference ordering in
advance. It first maximizes a SWF that combines utilitarian and maximin criteria in a way that treats the
most-preferred party as the worst-off. If all optimal solutions of this problem lie in the utilitarian region, a
utilitarian criterion is used to select one of the optimal solutions. (Here, a utility vector u is said to be in
the fair region if maxi{ui} −mini{ui} ≤ ∆, and otherwise in the utilitarian region.) Otherwise a leximax
criterion is used for all of the optimal solutions, subject to the preference ordering (i.e., maximize u1 first,
then u2 etc.). If we index the parties in order of decreasing preference, the SWF is
F (u) =

nu1, if |ui − uj | ≤ ∆ for all i, j∑
i
ui + (N
+ −N−)∆, otherwise (5)
where N+ = |{i | u1 > ui}| and N− = |{i | u1 < ui}| and the term (N+ − N−)∆ achieves continuity.
While it is possible to pre-specify a preference ranking of parties in some applications, such as the kidney
exchange problem, this is not possible in many applications. Also the leximax criterion is not used until
optimal solutions of the SWF are already obtained, and then applied only to the optimal solutions. We
prefer to allow a leximax criterion to play a role in evaluating all the possible solutions.
3 Defining the Social Welfare Functions
We now propose general-purpose SWFs that combine utilitarian and leximax criteria. Our aim is to preserve
the desirable properties of the Hooker-Williams SWF while avoiding some of the shortcomings of it and other
SWFs discussed above. In particular, we regulate the fairness/efficiency trade-off with a parameter ∆ that
has a practical interpretation. By replacing the maximin with a leximax criterion, we allow the fairness
criterion to reflect the actual utility levels of all disadvantaged parties rather than just that of the worst-off.
In addition, we do not assume a predefined preference ordering of the parties when applying the leximax
criterion. Thus a utility vector u is lexicographically greater than or equal to u′ when u〈k〉 ≥ u′〈k〉 and
(u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉) = (u′〈1〉, . . . , u
′
〈k−1〉) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
To combine the leximax and utilitarian criteria, we propose optimizing a sequence of social welfare
functions F1(u), . . . , Fn(u), each of which combines maximin and utilitarian measures. The first function
F1(u) is the Hooker-Williams function (4) defined earlier and is maximized over u = (u1, . . . , un) to obtain
a value for u〈1〉. Each subsequent function Fk(u) is maximized over u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉, while fixing utilities
u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉 to the values already obtained, to determine a value for u〈k〉. The process terminates when
maximizing Fk(u) yields a value of u〈k〉 that lies outside the fair region. At this point, Fk(u) is utilitarian,
and utilities u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉 are determined simultaneously by maximizing Fk(u) while fixing u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉
to the values already obtained. We refer to a utility vector (u〈1〉, . . . , u〈n〉) that results from this process as
socially optimal.
We will describe this sequential optimization procedure more precisely in Section 5, but we must first
define and explain the functions Fk(u). To develop functions that are continuous as well as analogous to the
Hooker-Williams SWF F1(u) in (4), it is helpful to write F1(u) as
F1(u) = t(u)u〈1〉 +
(
t(u)− 1)∆ + n∑
i=t(u)+1
u〈i〉
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Maximizing F1(u) determines the location of the fair region because it determines the value of u〈1〉, and the
fair region is the interval [u〈1〉, u〈1〉 + ∆]. The function F1(u) gives priority to the smallest utility u〈1〉 by
allowing it to represent all the utilities in the fair region and assigning it a weight t(u) equal to the size of
the fair region, while utilities in the utilitarian region receive only unit weight. However, utilities in the fair
region other than u〈1〉 do not appear in the SWF, and their actual values therefore have no bearing on social
welfare. One can even reduce them to u〈1〉 without affecting the value of F1(u).
We now generalize the F1(u) to Fk(u) in a way that takes into account the other utilities in the fair
region. For k = 2, . . . , n, we define
Fk(u) =

k∑
i=1
(n− i+ 1)u〈i〉 +
n∑
i=t(u)+1
(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆), if t(u) ≥ k
n∑
i=1
u〈i〉, if t(u) < k
(6)
This results in an optimization problem that is quite different than when k = 1, because the fair region has
already been determined by maximizing F1(u). Utilities u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉 have been fixed by the solutions
of prior optimization problems and therefore appear in Fk(u) as constants, while u〈k〉 remains as the only
variable in the fair region. The actual value of this utility plays a role in the SWF, since increasing u〈k〉
increases Fk(u). Furthermore, u〈k〉 receives more weight than utilities in the utilitarian region, because it
has weight n − k + 1, while those in the utilitarian region receive weight 1. Since the weight is greater for
small k, less advantaged parties receive greater priority. However, the weight does not depend on the number
of utilities in the fair region as in F1(u), as this would result in a discontinuous SWF.
Thus as Fk(u) is maximized for increasing values of k, each utility u〈k〉 in the fair region receives priority
at some point in the process. The process stops when maximizing Fk(u) yields a solution in which u〈k〉
is the only remaining utility in the fair region, at which point the solution determines the values of all
remaining utilities u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉. This scheme incorporates lexicographic optimization in the sense that the
smaller utilities are determined earlier in the sequence, although rather than maximizing u〈k〉 in step k,
we maximize a SWF that gives priority to u〈k〉. Utilitarianism in incorporated because each maximization
problem considers total utility as well as fairness.
For extreme values of ∆, this process yields purely utilitarian or purely leximax solutions. When ∆ = 0,
we have t(u) = 1 for all u, and F1(u) reduces to a utilitarian criterion. The fair region is the single point u〈1〉,
and we solve the social welfare problem simply by maximizing F1(u), which yields a utilitarian solution. For
sufficiently large ∆, t(u) = n for all feasible u, and Fk(u) is (n− k+ 1)u〈k〉 plus a constant for k = 1, . . . , n.
Since all uis lie in the fair region, we sequentially maximize Fk(u) for k = 1, . . . n and therefore obtain a
pure leximax solution. Intermediate values of ∆ combine utilitarian and leximax criteria.
Figure 4 illustrates how maximizing F1(u), . . . , Fn(u) sequentially is more sensitive to equity than max-
imizing F1(u), which has the flat region shown in Fig. 3, as noted earlier. Suppose we determine a value for
u1 by maximizing F1(u), say u1 = 0. Then the function F2(u) has no flat regions, as is evident in Fig. 4,
and the solutions in the flat region of Fig. 3 are now distinguished.
4 Properties of the Social Welfare Functions
We now investigate some mathematical properties of the social welfare functions Fk(u). After proving
continuity, we show that while Fk(u) need not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition, it satisfies a somewhat
weaker condition.
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Figure 4: Contours of F2(0, u2, u3) with ∆ = 3 and contour interval 1.
Theorem 1. The functions Fk(u) are continuous for k = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. To prove continuity of F1(u), it suffices to show that each term of (4) is continuous, because a sum
of continuous functions is continuous. The first term of (4) is a constant, and the second term is continuous
because order statistics are continuous functions. Each term of of the summation is continuous because it is
the maximum of two continuous functions. To show that Fk(u) is continuous for k ≥ 2, it is convenient to
write (6) as
Fk(u) =
k−1∑
i=1
(n− i+ 1)u〈i〉 + (n− k + 1)u〈k〉 − (n− k)(u〈k〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ +
n∑
i=k+1
(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (7)
which simplifies to
Fk(u) =
k−1∑
i=1
(n− i+ 1)u〈i〉 + (n− k + 1) min{u〈1〉 + ∆, u〈k〉}+
n∑
i=k
(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+
Because order statistics are continuous, u〈k〉 and u〈1〉 are continuous functions of u. Also min{u〈1〉+∆, u〈k〉}
and (u〈i〉−u〈1〉−∆)+ are continuous because they are the minimum or maximum of continuous functions.
We now investigate whether the SWFs Fk(u) satisfy the Pigou-Dalton and related conditions. Recall
that the Pigou-Dalton condition requires that any utility transfer from a better-off party to a worse-off
party increases (or at least does not decrease) social welfare. We will not require a strict increase, because
otherwise a pure utilitarian SWF fails the condition. Thus F (u) satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition if
F (u+ ei− ej) ≥ F (u) for any i, j and any  > 0, where ui < uj and ei, ej are the ith and jth unit vectors,
respectively.
It is stated in Karsu and Morton (2015) that the Hooker-Williams SWF F1(u) satisfies the Pigou-Dalton
condition, but this is true only for n = 2. Figure 3 provides a counterexample for n = 3. The move from
point A to point B represents a utility transfer from a better-off party to a worse-off party. This strictly
reduces social welfare, because B lies on a lower contour than A. Similar counterexamples show that Fk(u)
can violate the Pigou-Dalton condition for k ≥ 2.
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Figure 5: Illustration of proof of Theorem 2.
While it is widely recognized that an equality measure should satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition, this
is not obviously true of Fk(u), since it is not an equality measure or even a fairness measure. In any
event, Chateauneuf and Moyes (2005) have defined a weaker form of the Pigou-Dalton condition that all
the functions Fk(u) satisfy. It is based on transfers of utility from a better-off class to a worse-off class
rather than from one individual to another. Specifically, it examines the consequences of transferring a given
amount of utility from individuals whose utility lies above any given threshold (taking an equal share from
each) to those whose utility lies below any given threshold (giving an equal share to each). Arguably, only
such transfers should be considered, because a removal of utility from the upper range should remove at
least as much from the best-off individual as from other well-off individuals, and an endowment of utility on
the lower range should benefit the worst-off individual at least as much as other badly-off individuals. The
Chateauneuf-Moyes (C-M) condition requires that such transfers result in at least as much social welfare.
To define the C-M condition formally, let us say that a C-M transfer is a transfer of utility from u to u′
such that u1 ≤ · · · ≤ un as well as u′1 ≤ · · · ≤ u′n, and for some pair of integers `, h with 1 ≤ ` < h ≤ n, we
have u` < uh and
u′ = u+

`
∑`
i=1
ei − 
n− h+ 1
n∑
i=h
ei
A SWF F (u) satisfies the C-M condition if C-M transfers never decrease social welfare. That is, for any u
and any C-M transfer from u to u′,
F (u′) ≥ F (u) (8)
for sufficiently small  > 0.
Theorem 2. The Hooker-Williams social welfare function F1(u) satisfies the Chateauneuf-Moyes condition.
Proof. It suffices to show that (8) holds for any u and sufficiently small  > 0. There are three types of
utility transfer, illustrated in Fig. 5: (a) ` < h ≤ t(u), (b) ` ≤ t(u) < h, and (c) t(u) < ` < h. The
resulting utility gain by individuals 1, . . . `, and loss by individuals h, . . . , n, are indicated in Table 1. It is
clear on inspection of Fig. 5 that the gain is at least  in each case, and the loss never more than . The
C-M condition is therefore satisfied.
Table 1: Verifying the Chateauneuf-Moyes condition for F1(u)
Case Gain Loss
(a)
t(u)
`
 > 
n− t(u)
n− h+ 1 < 
(b)
t(u)
`
 >  
(c)  
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A similar proof (with six cases), given in Appendix 1, shows that the remaining SWFs satisfy the C-M
condition.
Theorem 3. The social welfare functions Fk(u) satisfy the Chateauneuf-Moyes condition for k = 2, . . . , n.
Although each Fk(u) satisfies the C-M condition, the feasible set can be designed in such a way that a
C-M transfer may not transform a socially optimal solution to another socially optimal solution. We will
demonstrate this in the next section.
5 The Sequential Optimization Procedure
We now describe in detail how one can obtain a socially optimal utility distribution. We wish to maximize
the sequence of social welfare functions F1(u), . . . , Fn(u), subject to resource constraints, in such a way that
maximizing Fk(u) determines the value of the kth smallest ui in the socially optimal solution. We therefore
maximize Fk(u) subject to the condition that (a) the uis already determined are fixed to the values obtained
for them, and (b) the remaining uis must be at least as large as the largest ui already determined. The
unfixed ui with the smallest value in the solution becomes the utility determined by maximizing Fk(u).
For now, we indicate resource limits by writing u ∈ U . In practice, they would be formulated in a MILP
model by introducing variables and constraints that specify resource limitations and how resource allocations
to individual parties translate to utilities. This will be illustrated in our experiments in Section 10.
To state the optimization procedure more precisely, we define a sequence of maximization problems
P1, . . . , Pk, where P1 maximizes F1(u) subject to u ∈ U , and Pk for k = 2, . . . , n is
max Fk(u)
uij = u¯ij , j = 1, . . . , k − 1
ui ≥ u¯ik−1 , i ∈ Ik
u ∈ U
(9)
The indices ij are defined so that uij is the utility determined by solving Pj . In particular, uij is the utility
with the smallest value among the unfixed utilities in an optimal solution obtained by solving Pj . Thus
ij = argmin
i∈Ij
{u[j]i }
where u[j] is an optimal solution of Pj and Ij = {1, . . . , n} \ {i1, . . . , ij−1}. We denote by u¯ij = u[j]ij the
solution value obtained for uij in Pj . We need only solve Pk for k = 1, . . . ,K + 1, where K is the largest k
for which u¯ik ≤ u¯i1 + ∆. The solution of the social welfare problem is then
ui =
{
u¯i for i = i1, . . . , iK−1
u
[K]
i for i ∈ IK
As remarked earlier, a C-M transfer applied to a socially optimal solution need not yield another socially
optimal solution. To see this, suppose n = 4, ∆ = 5, and the feasible set consists only of the three vectors
on the left:
u1 = (1, 2, 8, 9) (24, 15, 27, 35)
u2 = (2, 3, 7, 8) (24, 18, 32, 39)
u3 = (1, 2, 3, 12) (25, 16, 22, 28)
The corresponding values (F1(u), . . . , F4(u)) are shown on the right. Distribution u
2 results from applying
a C-M transfer to the socially optimal distribution u1, but u2 is not socially optimal because u1 = 2 in no
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optimal solution of P1. Rather, the unique optimal solution of P1 is u
3, in which u1 = 1. This situation can
occur when a socially optimal distribution u is not an optimal solution of P1. In the example, u
1 is not an
optimal solution of P1.
We can simplify the development to follow by removing the initial constants from Fk(u) for k ≥ 2,
resulting in the SWF
F¯k(u) = (n− k + 1)u〈k〉 +
n∑
i=k
(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (10)
Although the functions F¯k(u) do not satisfy the C-M condition, they obviously yield the same socially
optimal solutions as the original SWFs. We therefore solve problems P¯k rather than Pk for k ≥ 2, where
P¯k results from replacing Fk(u) with F¯k(u) in Pk. For notational convenience we let P¯1 denote the original
problem P1.
6 Mixed Integer Programming Model
For practical solution of the optimization problems P¯k, we wish to formulate them as MILP models. We
drop the resource constraints u ∈ U from problems P¯1, . . . , P¯n to obtain P ′1, . . . , P ′n, because we wish to
analyze the MILP formulations of the SWFs without the complicating factor of resource constraints. These
constraints can later be added to the optimization models before they are solved. In addition, problems
P ′1, . . . , P
′
n contain innocuous auxiliary constraints that make the problems MILP representable.
The MILP model for P ′1 follows a different pattern than the models for P
′
2, . . . , P
′
n, and we therefore treat
the two cases separately. Problem P ′1 can be written
max z1
z1 ≤ nu〈1〉 + (n− 1)∆ +
n∑
i=2
(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (a)
ui ≥ 0, all i (b)
ui − uj ≤M, all i, j (c)
(11)
Constraints (c) ensure MILP representability, as explained in Hooker and Williams (2012), because they
imply that the hypograph of (11) is a finite union of polyhedra having the same recession cone (Jeroslow
1987). Figure 6 illustrates their effect on the feasible region for n = 2. The constraints have no practical
import for sufficiently large M , although for theoretical purposes we assume only M > ∆.
The MILP model for P ′1 can be written as follows:
max z1
z1 ≤ (n− 1)∆ +
n∑
i=1
vi (a)
ui −∆ ≤ vi ≤ ui −∆δi, i = 1, . . . , n (b)
w ≤ vi ≤ w + (M −∆)δi, i = 1, . . . , n (c)
ui ≥ 0, δi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n
(12)
The following is proved in Hooker and Williams (2012).
Theorem 4. Model (12) is a correct formulation of P ′1.
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Figure 6: Social welfare function for F1(u) with MILP representable hypograph.
When k ≥ 2, the expression (10) for F¯k(u) implies that problem P ′k can be written
max zk
zk ≤ (n− k + 1) min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+
∑
i∈Ik
(ui − u¯i1 −∆)+ (a)
ui ≥ u¯ik−1 , i ∈ Ik (b)
ui − u¯i1 ≤M, i ∈ Ik (c)
(13)
The constraints (13c) are included to ensure that the problem is MILP representable. Since u¯i1 is a constant,
the hypograph is a union of bounded polyhedra whose recession cones consist of the origin only and are
therefore identical.
The MILP model for P ′k when k = 2, . . . , n is
16
max zk
zk ≤ (n− k + 1)σ +
∑
i∈Ik
vi (a)
0 ≤ vi ≤Mδi, i ∈ Ik (b)
vi ≤ ui − u¯i1 −∆ +M(1− δi), i ∈ Ik (c)
σ ≤ u¯i1 + ∆ (d)
σ ≤ w (e)
w ≤ ui, i ∈ Ik (f)
ui ≤ w +M(1− i), i ∈ Ik (g)∑
i∈Ik
i = 1 (h)
w ≥ u¯ik−1 (i)
ui − u¯i1 ≤M, i ∈ Ik (j)
δi, i ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ Ik
(14)
Theorem 5. Model (14) is a correct formulation of P ′k for k = 2, . . . , n.
Proof. We first show that given any (u, zk) that is feasible for (13), where uij = u¯ij for j = 1, . . . , k − 1,
there exist v, δ, , w, σ for which (u, zk,v, δ, , w, σ) is feasible for (14). Constraint (14j) follows directly
from (13c). To satisfy the remaining constraints in (14), we set
(δi, i, vi) =

(0, 0, 0), if ui − u¯i1 ≤ ∆ and i 6= κ
(0, 1, 0), if ui − u¯i1 ≤ ∆ and i = κ
(1, 0, ui − u¯i1 −∆), if ui − u¯i1 > ∆ and i 6= κ
(1, 1, ui − u¯i1 −∆), if ui − u¯i1 > ∆ and i = κ
 , i ∈ Ik
w = uκ
σ = min{u¯i1 + ∆, uκ}
(15)
where κ is an arbitrarily chosen index in Ik such that uκ = u〈k〉. It is easily checked that these assignments
satisfy constraints (b)–(h). They satisfy (i) because (13b) implies that uκ ≥ u¯ik−1 . To show they satisfy
(14a), we note that (14a) is implied by (13a) because min{u¯i1 + ∆, uκ} ≤ σ and (ui − u¯i1 −∆)+ ≤ vi for
i ∈ Ik. Since (13a) is satisfied by (u, z), it follows that (14a) is satisfied by (15).
For the converse, we show that for any (u, zk,v, δ, , w, σ) that satisfies (14), (u, zk) satisfies (13). Con-
straint (13b) follows from (14f) and (14i), and (13c) is identical to (14j). To verify that (13a) is satisfied,
we let κ be the index for which κ = 1, which is unique due to (14g). It suffices to show that (14a) implies
(13a) when the remaining constraints of (14) are satisfied. For this it suffices to show that
σ ≤ min{u¯i1 + ∆, uκ} (16)
vi ≤ (ui − u¯i1 −∆)+, i ∈ Ik (17)
(16) follows from (d), (e), and (f) of (14). (17) follows from (b) and (c) of (14). This proves the theorem.
7 Valid Inequalities
In this section, we identify some valid inequalities that can strengthen the MILP model of P ′k for k ≥ 2. The
MILP model (12) for P ′1 is already sharp, meaning that the inequality constraints of the model describe the
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convex hull of the feasible set, and there is therefore no benefit in adding valid inequalities. The sharpness
property may be lost when budget constraints are added, but the resulting model may remain a relatively
tight formulation. When n ≤ 3, the models P ′k for k ≥ 2 become sharp when the valid inequalities described
below are added. This is not true when n ≥ 4, but the valid inequalities nonetheless tighten the formulation.
The sharpness of the MILP model (12) for P ′1 is proved in Hooker and Williams (2012). We present a
simpler proof in Appendix 2.1
Theorem 6. The MILP model (12) is a sharp representation of P ′1 (11).
We now describe a class of valid inequalities that can be added to the MILP model (14) of P ′k for k ≥ 2
to tighten the formulation.
Theorem 7. The following inequalities are valid for P ′k for k ≥ 2:
zk ≤
∑
i∈Ik
ui (18)
zk ≤ (n− k + 1)ui + β
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
(uj − u¯ik−1), i ∈ Ik (19)
where
β =
M −∆
M − (u¯ik−1 − u¯i1)
=
(
1− ∆
M
)(
1− u¯ik−1 − u¯i1
M
)−1
Proof. It suffices to show that for any (u, zk,v, δ, , w) that satisfies (14), where uij = u¯ij for j = 1, . . . , k − 1,
the vector u satisfies (18) and (19). Since we know from Theorem 5 that u is feasible in (13), it suffices to
show that (13) implies (18) and (19). To derive (18), we write (13a) as
zk ≤
∑
i∈Ik
(
min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆)+
)
(20)
For any term i in the summation, we consider two cases. If ui ≤ u¯i1 + ∆, then u〈k〉 ≤ u¯i1 + ∆ (because
u〈k〉 ≤ ui), and the term reduces to u〈k〉. If ui > u¯i1 + ∆, term i becomes
min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆) = min{0, u〈k〉 − u¯i1 −∆}+ ui ≤ ui
In either case, term i is less than or equal to ui, and (18) follows.
To establish (19), it is enough to show that (19) is implied by (13) for each i ∈ Ik. We consider the same
two cases as before.
Case 1: ui − u¯i1 ≤ ∆, which implies u〈k〉 − u¯i1 ≤ ∆. Since u satisfies (13a), we have
zk ≤ (n− k + 1)u〈k〉 +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
(uj − u¯i1 −∆) (21)
It suffices to show that this implies
zk ≤ (n− k + 1)ui + β
( ∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1≤∆
(uj − u¯ik−1) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
(uj − u¯ik−1)
)
, (22)
1The proof in Hooker and Williams (2012) can be simplified by using only the multipliers αi =
M
n∆
(
ai − 1 + ∆M
)
for
i = 1, . . . , n, because each ai ≥ 1−∆/M . The multipliers βij in their proof are unnecessary.
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because (22) is equivalent to the desired inequality (19). But (21) implies (22) because u〈k〉 ≤ ui by definition
of u〈k〉, uj − u¯ik−1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Ik due to (13b), and it can be shown that
β(uj − u¯ik−1) ≥ uj − u¯i1 −∆ (23)
for any j ∈ Ik. To show (23), we note that the definition of β implies the following identity:
u¯i1 − u¯ik−1 + ∆ = (1− β)(M + u¯i1 − u¯ik−1).
Adding (1− β)u¯ik−1 to both sides, we obtain
u¯ik−1 − βu¯ik−1 + ∆ = (1− β)(M + u¯i1) ≥ (1− β)uj , (24)
where the inequality holds because M + u¯i1 ≥ uj due to (13c). We obtain (23) by rearranging (24).
Case 2: ui − u¯i1 > ∆. It again suffices to show that (13) implies (22). Due to the case hypothesis, we
have from (13a) that
zk ≤ (n− k + 1) min{u¯1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
(uj − u¯i1 −∆)+
This can be written
zk ≤ (n− k + 1)ui − (n− k + 1)
(
ui −min{u¯1 + ∆, u〈k〉}
)
+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
(uj − u¯i1 −∆)+
which can be written
zk ≤ (n−k+1)ui−(n−k)
(
ui−min{u¯1+∆, u〈k〉}
)
−
(
u¯1+∆−min{u¯1+∆, u〈k〉}
)
+
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
(uj−u¯i1−∆)+ (25)
The second term is nonpositive because ui > u¯1 + ∆ by the case hypothesis, and ui ≥ u〈k〉. The third term
is clearly nonpositive. Thus (25) implies (22) because uj − u¯ik−1 ≥ 0 and (23) holds for j ∈ Ik as before.
8 Modeling Groups of Individuals
In many applications, utility is naturally allocated to groups rather than individuals, where individuals
within each group receive an equal allocation. This occurs, for example, in the health care example we
discuss in Section 10, in which groups correspond to classes of patients who have the same disease and a
similar prognosis. In other applications, the number of individuals may be too large for practical solution,
since problem Pi must be solved for each individual i. In such cases, individuals can typically be grouped
into a few classes within which the individual differences are small or irrelevant, thus making the problem
tractable and the results easier to digest. We therefore modify the above SWFs to accommodate groups
rather than individuals. Since the proofs are similar to those for individuals, we relegate the proofs to
Appendix 2.
We suppose there are n groups of possibly different sizes. We let ui denote the utility of each individual
in group i and si the number of individuals in the group. We can modify F1 for groups in the same fashion
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Figure 7: Contours of G¯2(0, u2, u3) with (s2, s3) = (2, 3), ∆ = 3, and contour interval 5.
as Hooker and Williams, namely by replacing the utility variables within group i with the same variable ui.
If u = (u1, . . . , un), this yields the SWF
G1(u) =
( n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
∆ +
( n∑
i=1
si
)
u〈1〉 +
n∑
i=1
si(ui − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (26)
Hooker and Williams prove the following.
Theorem 8. The problem P
′
1, modified for groups, is equivalent to the MILP model
max z1
z1 ≤
( n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
∆ +
n∑
i=1
sivi
ui −∆ ≤ vi ≤ ui −∆δi, i = 1, . . . , n
w ≤ vi ≤ w + (M −∆)δi, i = 1, . . . , n
ui ≥ 0, i, δi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n
(27)
If we take a similar approach to modifying F¯k(u) for k ≥ 2 to accommodate groups, we obtain the
following (as shown in Appendix 2):
G¯k(u) =
( n∑
i=k
s〈i〉
)
min{u〈1〉 + ∆, u〈k〉}+
n∑
i=k
s〈i〉(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (28)
As before, utilities ui1 , . . . , uik−1 are fixed by the solutions of P¯1, . . . , P¯k−1. Also u〈k〉 is the smallest utility
among {ui | i ∈ Ik}, where again Ik = {1, . . . , n} \ {i1, . . . , ik−1}. If there is a tie for the smallest, we resolve
the tie arbitrarily by choosing, say, ui as the smallest, in which case s〈k〉 = si. It is clear on inspection that
G¯k(u) is well defined because its value is not affected by how the tie is resolved. Contours for G¯2(0, u2, u3)
are illustrated in Fig. 7. Since u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉 are fixed in P¯k, we need only show continuity with respect to
the remaining utilities.
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Theorem 9. The functions G¯k(u) are continuous in u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉 for k = 1, . . . , n.
The group version of P ′k becomes
max zk
zk ≤
(∑
i∈Ik
si
)
min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+
∑
i∈Ik
si(ui − u¯i1 −∆)+ (a)
ui ≥ u¯ik−1 , i ∈ Ik (b)
ui − u¯i1 ≤M, i ∈ Ik (c)
(29)
The MILP model for (29) is very similar to the one we developed for (13):
max zk
zk ≤
(∑
i∈Ik
si
)
σ +
∑
i∈Ik
sivi (a)
(14b)–(14j) (b)–(j)
δi, i ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ Ik
(30)
Theorem 10. The problem P ′k, reformulated for groups, is equivalent to (30) for k = 2, . . . , n.
Hooker and Williams (2012) prove that (27) is a sharp representation of P
′
1 reformulated for groups. We
present a simpler proof in Appendix 2.
Theorem 11. The MILP model (27) is a sharp representation of P ′1 reformulated for groups.
Finally, we describe a set of valid inequalities for the MILP model (30) for k ≥ 2.
Theorem 12. The following inequalities are valid for the group problem P ′k for k ≥ 2:
zk ≤
∑
i∈Ik
siui (31)
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
si
)
uj + β
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
sj(uj − u¯ik−1), i ∈ Ik (32)
where
β =
M −∆
M − (u¯ik−1 − u¯i1)
=
(
1− ∆
M
)(
1− u¯ik−1 − u¯i1
M
)−1
9 Step-by-Step Practical Guide
We now provide a practical guide for incorporating equity and efficiency within an existing optimization
model. We suppose that the model’s constraint set is C. We will define a series of optimization models
M1, . . . ,MK that must be solved to obtain a solution that balances equity and efficiency. Each Mk will
contain the constraints in C as well as some additional constraints and an objective function as described
below. If C is a linear or mixed-integer constraint set, then each Mk will be an MILP model. Nonlinear
constraints in C will, of course, result in nonlinear models Mk.
Step 1. Decide what form of utility is to be distributed to the relevant parties. Utility can be profit,
negative cost, or any other benefit that is appropriate to the situation. In the healthcare resource
allocation problem of the next section, utility is the number of quality-adjusted life years experienced
by a patient. In the emergency shelter location problem that follows it, utility is negative cost, where
cost is measured as the distance one must travel to reach an assigned shelter.
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Step 2. Identify the parties to whom utility is to be distributed, and for whom fairness is a concern. The
parties could be individual persons or groups of people. Examples of groups might be organizations,
demographic groups, or geographic regions. Both examples of the next section distribute utility to
groups. In the healthcare case, treatments are allocated to classes of patients who have a similar
health condition, and in the shelter allocation case, shelter access is distributed to neighborhoods. It
is assumed that each individual in a given group receives roughly the same utility allotment, so that
fairness to the group is interpreted as fairness to the individuals in the group. When there are a large
number of individuals concerned, they can normally be grouped into a few categories of individuals
who are similar in relevant respects. For example, if age-related fairness is desired, the population
can be grouped into age categories. This not only makes the solution of the problem intelligible and
relevant to the fairness question, but it eases the computational burden. The number of optimization
models Mk to be solved is bounded above by the number of parties.
Step 3. Let variable ui represent the utility allocated to party i, or when the party is a group, to each
individual in the group i. There are n parties, and si is the number of people in group i. Add to
C constraints that define ui in terms of existing variables, and let C′ be the resulting constraint set.
In some applications, one may wish to model utility as a concave function of the resource that is
distributed, to reflect decreasing returns to scale. For example, the marginal utility of income may
decrease with the recipient’s wealth. In such cases, constraints can be introduced to define ui in terms
of resource variables in a nonlinear or piecewise linear fashion.
Step 4. Let M1 be (12) augmented by the constraints in C′, or if the parties are groups, let M1 be (27)
augmented by the constraints in C′. For k ≥ 2, let Mk be (14) augmented by C′, or in the group
model, let Mk be (30) augmented by C′. If desired, each model Mk for k ≥ 2 can be tightened by
adding the valid constraints (18)–(19) when the parties are individuals, or (31)–(32) when they are
groups. This may accelerate solution. Since eachMk may have multiple optimal solutions, we suggest
adding 
∑
i ui (or 
∑
i siui when the parties are groups) to the objective function as a tie-breaking
term, where  > 0 is a very small number.
Step 5. Select ∆ to reflect the desired trade-off between equity and efficiency, where ∆ = 0 leads to a purely
utilitarian solution, and sufficiently large ∆ leads to a purely leximax solution. Intermediate values of
∆ indicate that parties whose utility is within ∆ of the smallest utility are given a certain amount of
priority. A more detailed interpretation of ∆ is given in Section 3.
Step 6. The optimal solution ofMk determines the value of the kth smallest utility in the socially optimal
distribution u¯. First, solve M1, in which M is an upper bound on ui − uj for all i, j. Let u[1] be
the value of u in an optimal solution. Let ui1 be a variable for which u
[1]
i1
= mini{u[1]i | i = 1, . . . , n},
and let u¯i1 = u
[1]
i1
. Now do the following for k = 2, 3, . . . , n until u¯ik > u¯i1 + ∆. Solve Mk, in which
Ik = {1, . . . , n} \ {i1, . . . , ik−1}, and M is an upper bound on ui − u¯i1 for all i ∈ Ik. Let u[k] be an
optimal solution. Let uik be a variable for which u
[k]
ik
= mini{u[k]i | i ∈ Ik}, and let u¯ik = u[k]ik . If
u¯ik > u¯i1 + ∆ and k < n, let ui = u
[k]
i for i ∈ Ik \ {k}.
Step 7. The resulting utility vector u¯ is an optimal solution of the social welfare problem, using parameter
∆. At this point, decision makers may wish to re-solve the problem for different values of ∆ to obtain
a solution with the desired balance of equity and utility. In particular, they can select a parameter
value for which utilities u¯i within ∆ of u¯i1 represent parties that should receive priority.
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10 Applications
We now implement our approach on a healthcare resource allocation problem and a disaster management
problem. We solve all MILP instances using Gurobi 8.1.1 on a desktop PC running Windows 10.
10.1 Healthcare Resource Allocation
A proper balance between fairness and efficiency is crucial in the allocation of healthcare resources. Hooker
and Williams (2012) study a problem in which treatments are made available to patients on the basis of their
disease and prognosis. In discussing this case, we caution that the results we report should not be taken as
general recommendations for the allocation of medical resources. They are based on cost and clinical data
that are outdated and specific to a particular set of circumstances. We nonetheless use this example because
it allows comparison with the published Hooker-Williams (H-W) results on the same problem instance.
Patients are divided into groups based on their disease and prognosis. There is one treatment potentially
available to each patient group, and for policy consistency, it is provided to either all or none of the group
members. Binary variable yi is 1 if group i receives the recommended treatment and 0 otherwise. The
average utility ui experienced by members of group i is measured in terms of quality adjusted life years
(QALYs); qi is the net gain in QALYs for a member of group i when receiving the recommended treatment,
and αi is the expected QALYs experienced with medical management without the treatment. Thus
ui = αi + qiyi, i = 1, . . . , n (33)
The budget constraint is
n∑
i
siciyi ≤ B (34)
where si is the group size, ci the cost of treating one patient in group i, and B the total available budget.
The specific data can be found in Table 1 of the H-W paper. The budget is set so as to force some hard
decisions. Referring to the notation of the previous section, the original problem constraint set C consists of
(34) and yi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , n, and C′ is obtained by adding constraints (33).
The H-W results are reproduced here in Table 2, in which the columns indicate solutions values of yi for
the 33 patient groups and various ranges of ∆. The treatments are pacemaker implant, hip replacement,
aortic valve replacement, coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), heart and kidney transplant, and kidney
dialysis. Three types pf CABG surgery are distinguished (left main, double, and triple bypass), and kidney
dialysis patients are distinguished by years of life expectancy with dialysis. Most of these categories are
further divided into one, two, or three patient groups representing the degree of severity of the disease. The
last column indicates the average number of QALYs per patient for each ∆ range.
The results contain several interesting features, but most obvious is the transfer of resources from heart
bypass surgery to dialysis as ∆ increases. Kidney dialysis is quite costly, because the treatment is ongoing
rather than a one-time event such as surgery. The payoff in QALYs per unit cost is therefore relatively low,
and bypass surgery is selected when the utilitarian objective dominates (smaller values of ∆). As ∆ increases,
resources are transferred to dialysis patients, who are the worst off without treatment; heart bypass patients
tend to have a fairly long life expectancy without the surgery.
Most relevant here is the fact that the average QALYs per patient decrease relatively little as ∆ increases,
as can be seen in the last column of Table 3. This is due to the fact that the H-W method does not take
into account the utility levels of patients in the fair region (i.e., within ∆ of the lowest), except for the very
lowest. This results in a large space of alternate optimal solutions, many of them quite different from each
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Table 2: Results of healthcare example from Table 2 of Hooker and Williams (2012). A 1 indicates that the
treatment is given to all members of a patient group, and a 0 indicates that the treatment is given to none.
∆ Pace- Hip Aortic CABG Heart Kidney Kidney dialysis Avg.
range maker repl. valve L 3 2 trans. trans. <1 1-2 2-5 5-10 >10 QALYs.
0-3.3 111 111 111 111 111 111 1 11 0 0 000 0000 000 7.54
3.4-4.0 111 111 111 111 111 111 0 11 1 0 000 0000 000 7.54
4.0-4.4 111 111 111 111 111 111 0 01 1 0 000 0000 001 7.51
4.5-5.01 111 011 111 111 111 111 1 01 1 0 000 0000 011 7.43
5.02-5.55 111 011 011 111 111 111 1 01 1 0 000 0001 011 7.36
5.56-5.58 111 011 011 111 111 011 0 01 1 0 000 0001 111 7.36
5.59 111 011 011 110 111 111 0 01 1 0 000 0001 111 7.20
5.60-13.1 111 111 111 101 000 000 1 11 1 0 111 1111 111 7.06
13.2-14.2 111 011 111 011 000 000 1 11 1 1 111 1111 111 7.03
14.3-15.4 111 111 111 011 000 000 1 11 1 1 101 1111 111 7.13
15.5 up 111 011 111 011 001 000 1 11 1 0 011 1111 111 7.19
other. To deal with this indeterminacy, the H-W experiments break ties by adding 
∑
i siui to the objective
function. This means that utilities in the fair region (except the lowest) are treated in a utilitarian fashion.
Thus as ∆ increases, the solution becomes basically utilitarian again, except that the welfare of the very
worst-off patient is maximized.
Our results appear in Tables 3 and 4, one with and one without tie-breaking. We discuss the merits of
tie-breaking below, but in our experiments it has a rather small effect on the solution and does not change
the analysis to follow. The computation time for a given ∆ is negligible, almost always less than 0.5 second,
even though there are 33 groups. The average utility per patient is plotted in Fig. 8. The fluctuations in
utility as ∆ increases indicate the subtlety and complexity of balancing leximax fairness and utilitarianism.
The discontinuities are due to the discreteness of the problem. When a group moves into or out of the fair
region, the impact on average utility can be significant even when the effect on social welfare is small.
Table 3: Results of healthcare example, without tie-breaking.
∆ Pace- Hip Aortic CABG Heart Kidney Kidney dialysis Avg.
range maker repl. valve L 3 2 trans. trans. <1 1-2 2-5 5-10 >10 QALYs.
0-0.2 111 111 111 111 111 111 1 11 0 0 000 0000 000 7.544
0.3 111 111 111 111 111 011 1 11 0 0 100 0000 001 7.542
0.4 111 111 111 111 011 011 1 11 0 1 100 1000 000 7.516
0.5 111 111 111 111 011 011 0 11 0 1 110 1000 000 7.514
0.6 111 111 111 111 011 001 1 01 0 1 111 1100 000 7.453
0.7 111 111 111 111 011 001 0 00 0 1 111 1100 100 7.405
0.8 111 111 111 011 011 001 1 00 0 1 111 1100 110 7.354
0.9 111 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 0 1 111 1101 110 7.283
1-1.9 111 111 011 011 001 001 1 00 0 1 111 1101 111 7.226
2-3.3 111 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 0 1 111 1111 111 7.206
3.4-4.55 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
4.56-5.06 001 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.940
5.07-5.34 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
5.35-6.59 111 111 111 001 001 000 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 7.123
6.60-8.43 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
8.44-11.5 001 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.940
11.6-13 010 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.802
13 up 000 110 110 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 5.942
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Table 4: Results of the healthcare example, with tie-breaking:
∆ Pace- Hip Aortic CABG Heart Kidney Kidney dialysis Avg.
range maker repl. valve L 3 2 trans. trans. <1 1-2 2-5 5-10 >10 QALYs.
0-0.2 111 111 111 111 111 111 1 11 0 0 000 0000 000 7.544
0.3 111 111 111 111 111 011 1 11 0 0 100 0000 001 7.542
0.4 111 111 111 111 011 011 1 11 0 1 100 1000 000 7.516
0.5 111 111 111 111 011 011 0 11 0 1 110 1000 000 7.514
0.6 111 111 111 111 011 001 1 01 0 1 111 1100 000 7.453
0.7 111 111 111 111 011 001 0 00 0 1 111 1100 100 7.405
0.8 111 111 111 011 011 001 1 00 0 1 111 1100 110 7.354
0.9 111 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 0 1 111 1101 110 7.283
1-1.9 111 111 011 011 001 001 1 00 0 1 111 1101 111 7.226
2 111 111 111 011 011 000 1 00 0 1 111 1111 011 7.274
2.1-3.2 111 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 0 1 111 1111 111 7.206
3.3 111 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1101 111 7.197
3.4-4.55 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
4.56-5.06 001 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.940
5.07-5.34 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
5.35-5.59 111 111 111 001 001 000 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 7.123
5.60-6.50 111 111 111 011 000 000 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 7.099
6.51-6.59 111 111 111 001 001 000 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 7.123
6.60-7.59 011 111 111 011 001 000 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 7.091
7.60-9.6 101 111 111 011 001 000 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 7.012
9.7-12.2 000 111 111 011 001 001 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 6.607
12.3-12.7 010 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.802
12.8-13 000 111 110 011 001 001 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 6.309
13.1 000 111 111 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.058
13.2-14.5 000 110 110 011 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 5.942
14.6-15.5 000 111 110 111 001 001 1 00 1 1 111 1111 111 6.325
15.6 up 000 111 110 011 001 001 1 01 1 1 111 1111 111 6.309
Figure 8: Average QALYs of optimal outcomes in healthcare example
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We note first that the average utility per patient drops considerably as ∆ increases, indicating that equity
plays a larger role for ∆ > 0 than in the H-W solution. Kidney dialysis enters the solution for much smaller
values of ∆, and the more seriously ill kidney patients enter first, the reverse of what occurs in the H-W
solution. This reflects the fact that our solution is sensitive to the utility levels of all disadvantaged patient
groups rather than only the very worst-off. The trade-off parameter ∆ also conveys more information than
in the H-W case. Resources begin to transfer to dialysis patients when ∆ is only a fraction of a QALY. A
value of ∆ this small dictates that patients receive priority only when their life expectancy is within a few
months of the worst-off. One can therefore conclude that most dialysis patients are nearly as badly off as
the worst-off patient in a socially optimal solution. The H-W solution does not provide this information,
because it brings in most dialysis patients only when ∆ is greater than 5 QALYs or so.
There are other differences with the H-W solution. Heart bypass surgery remains in the solution for
the most seriously ill patients, with some exceptions, through the entire range of ∆. This is again because
the solution is sensitive to their disadvantaged position even though they are not the worst-off. Pacemakers
now drop out of the solution for large ∆, even though pacemaker implantation is relatively inexpensive.
This is because the pacemaker patients are better off without treatment than any of the other patients
and therefore cease to receive priority as equity becomes more important. In general, these results indicate
that incorporating leximax rather than maximin fairness in a social welfare function yields more nuanced
solutions that are more sensitive to equity considerations.
Finally, we note that due to the nonmonotonicity of average utility with respect to ∆, solutions can
sometimes dominate others with respect to both efficiency and equity. For example, solutions with ∆ ≥ 14.5
dominate solutions with 13 ≤ ∆ ≤ 14.5 (see Fig. 8), and the latter might be rejected on that basis.
We experimented with tie-breaking because alternate optimal solutions typically exist at each stage of the
optimization procedure, if not to the same extent as when maximin fairness is used. Tables 3 and 4 indicate
that tie breaking has only a minor effect on the solution but results in greater sensitivity to ∆, and it may
therefore allow greater control over the equity/efficiency tradeoff. There is little difference in the average
utility for ∆ < 7.5, as is evident in Fig. 8, while differences can be greater for larger ∆. This is perhaps
because larger values of ∆ lead to more iterations in the solution procedure (i.e., more sequential optimization
problems are solved), and there is greater opportunity to introduce alternate optimal solutions with different
utility values. Tie-breaking may be desirable for policy-making purposes due to greater consistency in the
outcome, since otherwise the solution obtained is a random choice among the optima. Tie-breaking can also
allow one to obtain greater utility at the same level of ∆—although not always (as when 10 ≤ ∆ ≤ 12),
since breaking ties early in the sequence can fix utilities that preclude solutions with greater utility later in
the sequence. In any case, alternate optimal solutions are a regular feature of combinatorial optimization
problems, and we should expect nothing different here.
10.2 Shelter Location and Assignment
Disaster preparation and post-disaster response are important elements of humanitarian operations, in which
equity is an essential consideration. We apply our approach to the shelter location and assignment problem
investigated in Mostajabdaveh et al. (2019). There are two sets of decisions: where to construct shelters
in preparation for natural disasters, and how to assign one shelter to each potentially affected residential
area. When a disaster strikes, those affected will evacuate to their assigned shelter for protection and
supplies. Mostajabdaveh et al. solve a model with multiple scenarios representing possible demands and
street disruptions, but we simplify the problem by removing the stochastic element so as to clarify the
equity/efficiency trade-off.
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Utility is measured as negative cost, where cost is taken to be the travel distance between a residential
area and its assigned shelter. A conventional efficiency objective is to minimize the average travel distance
among all individuals. Optimizing the efficiency objective alone may result in unreasonable solutions that
force people in some areas to travel a long distance to their shelter. We argue that a just and reasonable
solution should try to reduce the distance for less advantaged areas without increasing average travel distance
inordinately. We show that our approach is applicable to obtain such a trade-off between equity and efficiency.
To formulate a MILP model of the problem, suppose m is the number of candidate locations for shelter,
and n is the number of population areas. For j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, cj is the shelter capacity, and ej is the cost
of opening a shelter at location j. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, si is the population of area i. We suppose that each
person living in area i must travel a distance of Dij to reach location j. We use two sets of binary decision
variables: for location j, yj = 1 means that a shelter is open at location j; for area i, Xij = 1 means all
persons living in the area are assigned to shelter j. Additionally, we impose a budget constraint requiring
that the total cost of opening shelters does not exceed B. The model of Mostajabdaveh et al. assumes that
each shelter is large enough for the entire population of any individual area, so that it is unnecessary to split
areas between shelters. The constraint set C for the problem is therefore
m∑
j=1
Xij = 1, i = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
siXij ≤ cjyj , j = 1, . . . ,m
m∑
j=1
ejyj ≤ B
Xij , yj ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m
The utility ui of each person in area i is defined by the following constraints, which are added to C to obtain
the constraint set C′:
ui = −
m∑
j=1
DijXij , i = 1, . . . , n
We generate problem instances with one of the methods used by Mostajabdaveh et al. Instances of
the capacitated warehouse location problem from Beasley (1988) are converted to shelter location instances
by identifying shelters with warehouses, residential areas with customers, and population counts si with
customer demands. The distance Dij is taken to be Cij/si, where Cij is the cost of meeting all of customer
i’s demand from warehouse j. We use instances cp92 (25 locations) and cp122 (50 locations), both having
50 customers. The budget B is set to 150000 for cp92 and 300000 for cp122.
The resulting average per capita utility is plotted against ∆ in Fig. 9, both with and without tie-breaking.
In this case, tie-breaking has very little effect, except for the pure leximax solution (∆ ≥ 37) of cap92.
Computation time is plotted against ∆ in Fig. 10. Run time is greater for intermediate values of ∆, but
never more than 18 seconds, and less than 10 seconds in most cases.
Figure 9 shows that, as expected, there is a generally decreasing trend in average per capita utility as
∆ increases. The trend is almost strictly monotonic in the cap122 instance, but utility jumps up when ∆
is about 30 in the cap92 instance. The instability is mostly due to the inherent complexity of trade-offs
in this instance, and the fact that neighborhood populations vary greatly. The nonmonotonicity can assist
decision making, as solutions corresponding to ∆ values between 23 and 30 are dominated by more equitable
solutions with respect to utility and may be discarded on this basis.
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(a) Instance cp92 (n = 50, m = 25) (b) Instance cp122 (n = 50, m = 50)
Figure 9: Average utility per person for the shelter location instances
(a) Instance cp92 (n = 50, m = 25) (b) Instance cp122 (n = 50, m = 50)
Figure 10: Runtime in shelter allocation example
To study the effect of increasing ∆ values more closely, we plot the socially optimal utility distribution
(with tie-breaking) against ∆ in Fig. 11. These plots show the evolution of per capita utility in individual
neighborhoods as ∆ increases. The shaded region indicates which utilities are in the fair region (within ∆ of
the worst). We see immediately that the problem is highly constrained, because the lowest utilities quickly
reach a plateau and remain at a low level even for large ∆ values. These neighborhoods are located at a
considerable distance from candidate shelter locations, and so they remain disadvantaged even when given
high priority. In this type of situation, it is particularly important to use a leximax rather than a maximin
criterion of fairness, so as to take into account the situation of disadvantaged neighborhoods other than the
very worst-off.
The leximax component yields the desired result, because several of the less advantaged neighborhoods
improve their status as ∆ increases. At the same time, some of the more privileged neighborhoods lose
utility as they begin to sacrifice somewhat for the sake of the more remote neighborhoods. Interestingly, the
less advantaged neighborhoods typically start to benefit from an increasing ∆ shortly before they enter the
fair region. The reason for this is that when a low utility level enters the fair region, it immediately becomes
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(a) Instance cp92 (n = 50, m = 25) (b) Instance cp122 (n = 50, m = 50)
Figure 11: Utility distributions in the shelter allocation instances
suboptimal due to the greater weight it receives there. It is therefore pushed up to one of the discrete feasible
levels outside the fair region. We also see in the plot for cp122 that some of the disadvantaged neighborhoods
temporarily sacrifice utility as ∆ enters the range from 15 to 22. This is to benefit better-off neighborhoods
to which priority is extended at this point. Their utility is restored for larger values of ∆ as the solution
becomes still more equity-based and additional utility is transferred from the best-off neighborhoods.
11 Conclusion
We propose a new systematic approach to balancing efficiency and equity in an optimization model, in
which utility serves as the efficiency measure and Rawlsian leximax fairness as the equity measure. We are
guided by the intuition that less advantaged utility recipients should be prioritized, but without an excessive
reduction in overall utility.
We combine leximax and utilitarian criteria by defining a trade-off parameter ∆ and dividing the feasible
utility range into a fair region and a utilitarian region, where the fair region consists of utilities within ∆
of the utility of the worst-off party. Leximax fairness is the dominating objective in the fair region, and
utility dominates otherwise. Thus a single parameter allows a decision maker to control the balance between
equity and efficiency by deciding which parties are sufficiently disadvantaged—that is, sufficiently near the
worst-off—to deserve some degree of priority.
For a given optimization model, we show how to accommodate both equity and efficiency by solving
a sequence of optimization problems, each of which maximizes a social welfare function (SWF) subject
to constraints from the original model. The SWFs are formulated using mixed integer constraints. They
successively give priority to the worst-off, the second worst-off, and so on, with the degree of priority gradually
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decreasing relative to utilities in the utilitarian region.
As proof of concept, we apply our method to health resource allocation and disaster preparation problems.
The solution time is at most a matter of seconds for a given value of ∆. We find that the solutions are not
only sensitive to equity considerations but reveal complex and subtle trade-offs. This suggests that the
modeling approach developed here can potentially serve as a useful mathematical tool for balancing fairness
and efficiency in real-world situations.
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Appendix 1
In this Appendix, we prove that Fk(u) satisfies the Chateauneuf-Moyes condition for k ≥ 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is clear that a sufficiently small utility-invariant transfer satisfies the C-M condition
when k > t(u), because in this case Fk(u) is simply utilitarian. We therefore need only consider the six
cases illustrated in Fig. 12, in which k ≤ t(u). It is convenient to write Fk(u) in the following form:
Fk(u) = t(u)u〈1〉 +
k∑
i=2
(n− i+ 1)u〈i〉 +
n∑
i=t(u)+1
(u〈i〉 −∆)
The resulting gain by individuals 1, . . . `, and loss by individuals h, . . . , n, are indicated in Table 5. In cases
(b)–(f), it is clear on inspection of Fig. 12 that the gain is more than  in each case, and the loss never more
than . In case (a), we note first that the gain can be written
n− `− 1
2
− n− t(u)
`
To show that the loss is no greater than the gain, it suffices to show this when h = ` + 1, since h ≥ ` + 1
and the loss is nonincreasing with respect to h. Thus it suffices to show
n− `− 1
2
− n− t(u)
`
≥ 1
n− `
( k∑
i=`+1
(n− i+ 1) + n− t(u)
)
Since k ≤ t(u) and each term of the summation is at most n− `, it suffices to show
n− `− 1
2
− n− t(u)
`
≥
(
t(u)− `)(n− `) + n− t(u)
n− `
Rearranging, we obtain (
n− t(u))(1
`
+
1
n− ` − 1
)
≤ `+ 1
2
(35)
This inequality is clearly satisfied when the following is false:
1
`
+
1
n− ` ≥ 1 (36)
We therefore assume (36) is true. Since (35) is clearly satisfied when ` = 1, we suppose ` ≥ 2, in which case
(36) implies n < `2/(`− 1). Since ` < h ≤ n, we can state
`+ 1 ≤ n < `
2
`− 1
or `2 − 1 ≤ n(` − 1) < `2. Since n and ` are positive integers, this implies n = ` + 1, in which case (35)
reduces to
`+ 1− t(u)
`
≤ `+ 1
2
This holds because t(u) ≥ `+ 1, and the theorem follows. 
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Figure 12: Illustration of proof of Theorem 3.
Appendix 2
In this Appendix, we derive the group-related SWFs G2(u), . . . , Gm(u) and prove the relevant theorems.
We obtain the SWFs by treating the group members as individuals and applying the the SWFs Fk(u) for
individuals, with the assumption that all individuals in a group have the same utility.
We begin by deriving G1(u). Let u
′
i′ be the utility of individual i
′, and let ui be the utility of each
individual in group i. There are n′ individuals and n groups. Let si be the size of group i, so that
n′ =
n∑
i=1
si (37)
Then
F1(u
′) = n′u′〈1〉 + (n
′ − 1)∆ +
n′∑
i′=1
(u′i′ − u′〈1〉 −∆)+
Since u〈1〉 = u′〈1〉 and group i has size si, we have
G1(u) =
( n∑
i=1
si
)
u〈1〉 +
( n∑
i=1
si − 1
)
∆ +
n∑
i=1
si(ui − u〈1〉 −∆)+
This is the formula used in Hooker and Williams (2012).
Hooker and Williams prove that (12) is a sharp representation of P
′
1, and (27) a sharp representation of
P
′
1 reformulated for groups. We present a simpler proof of both theorems. It is necessary only to prove the
latter, because the former is a special case of it.
Proof of Theorems 6 and 11. We prove Theorem 11, of which Theorem 6 is a special case in which si = 1
for each i. It suffices to show that any inequality z1 ≤ aTu+b that is valid for P ′1 is a surrogate (nonnegative
linear combination) of inequalities in (27). Let
N =
n∑
i=1
si
We first show that the following is a surrogate of (27) for any i:
z1 ≤ (N − 1)∆ +
(
si + (N − si) ∆
M
)
ui +
(
1− ∆
M
)∑
j 6=i
sjuj . (38)
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Table 5: Verifying the Chateauneuf-Moyes condition for Fk(u)
Case Gain Loss
(a)
1
`
(
t(u) +
∑`
i=2
(n− i+ 1)
)

1
n− h+ 1
( k∑
i=h
(n− i+ 1) + n− t(u)
)

(b)
1
`
(
t(u) +
∑`
i=2
(n− i+ 1)
)
 ≥ t(u)
`
 > 
n− t(u)
n− h+ 1 < 
(c)
1
`
(
t(u) +
k∑
i=2
(n− i+ 1)
)
 ≥ t(u)
`
 > 
n− t(u)
n− h+ 1 < 
(d)
1
`
(
t(u) +
∑`
i=2
(n− i+ 1)
)
 ≥ t(u)
`
 > 
n− h+ 1
n− h+ 1 = 
(e)
1
`
(
t(u) +
k∑
i=2
(n− i+ 1)
)
 ≥ t(u)
`
 > 
n− h+ 1
n− h+ 1 = 
(f)
1
`
(
t(u) +
k∑
i=2
(n− i+ 1) + `− t(u)
)
 ≥  n− h+ 1
n− h+ 1 = 
We then show that z1 ≥ aTu+ b is a surrogate of the inequalities (38). The theorem follows.
To show that (38) is a surrogate of (27), we first note that the following is a linear combination of the
upper bounds on vi in (27b) and (27c), using multipliers 1/∆ and 1/(M −∆), respectively:
vj ≤ ∆
M
w +
(
1− ∆
M
)
uj . (39)
We also have the following from (27b) and (27c):
vi ≤ ui. (40)
w ≤ vi. (41)
We now obtain the following, for any given i and j, as a linear combination of (39) and (41), using multipliers
1 and ∆/M , respectively:
vj ≤ ∆
M
vi +
(
1− ∆
M
)
uj . (42)
Finally, we obtain (38) for any given i by summing (27a) with multiplier 1, (40) with multiplier
si + (N − si) ∆
M
and (42) over all j 6= i with multiplier sj .
It remains to show that z1 ≤ aTu + b is a surrogate of (38) for i = 1, . . . , n. We first observe that
(u, z) = (0, (N −1)∆) is feasible in P ′1 and must therefore satisfy z1 ≤ aTu+ b, which implies b ≥ (N −1)∆.
We can assume without loss of generality that b = (N − 1)∆, since otherwise we can add an appropriate
multiple of the valid inequality 0 ≤ b to obtain the desired inequality z1 ≤ aTu + b. We also note that
(u, z) = (M, . . . ,M,NM + (N − 1)∆) is feasible and must satisfy z1 ≤ aTu+ (N − 1)∆, which means
m∑
j=1
aj ≥ N (43)
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Finally, we note that (u, z) = (Mei, (N −1)∆+si(M −∆)) is feasible for P ′1, where ei is the ith unit vector.
Substituting this into z1 ≤ aTu+ (N − 1)∆, we obtain
ai ≥
(
1− ∆
M
)
si (44)
Due to (43), we can suppose without loss of generality that
∑m
j=1 aj = N , since otherwise we can add
appropriate multiples of the valid inequalities 0 ≤ aj to obtain z1 ≤ aTu+ b.
To obtain z ≤ aTu+ b as a surrogate of (38), we sum (38) over all j using the multipliers
αi =
M
N∆
(
ai −
(
1− ∆
M
)
si
)
(45)
for each i. It is easily checked that
∑m
i=1 αi = 1, so that the linear combination has the form
z ≤ dTu+ (N − 1)∆ (46)
We wish to show that d = a. Note that
di =
(
si +N
∆
M
)
αi +
(
1− ∆
M
)
si
∑
j 6=i
αj
Using the fact that
∑m
j=1 αj = 1, this becomes
di = N
∆
M
αi +
(
1− ∆
M
)
si
which immediately reduces to di = ai. We conclude that (46) is a linear combination of the inequalities (38)
using multipliers αi. It remains to show that each αi is nonnegative, but this follows from (44) and (45). 
We now derive G¯k(u) for k ≥ 2. Recall that the SWF for individuals is
F¯k′(u
′) = (n′ − k′ + 1) min{u′〈1〉 + ∆, u′〈k′〉}+
n′∑
i′=k′
(u′〈i′〉 − u¯′〈1〉 −∆)+ (47)
To obtain G¯k(u), we again assume the individuals in each group i have the same utility ui. The first
individual in (47) that belongs to group k is individual
k′ = 1 +
k−1∑
j=1
sij (48)
Due to (37) and (48), the first term on the RHS of (47) is
(
n′ − 1−
k−1∑
j=1
sij + 1
)
min{u〈k〉 + ∆, u〈k〉} =
( n∑
i=k
s〈i〉
)
min{u〈k〉 + ∆, u〈k〉}
since all the utilities in a group are the same. Thus we have
G¯k(u) =
( n∑
i=k
s〈i〉
)
min{u〈1〉 + ∆, u〈k〉}+
n∑
i=k
s〈i〉(u〈i〉 − u〈1〉 −∆)+ (49)
We show as follows that G¯k(u) is continuous in u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉.
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Proof of Theorem 9. It suffices to show each term of (49) is a continuous function of u〈k〉, . . . , u〈n〉, with
u〈1〉, . . . , u〈k−1〉 and the corresponding group sizes s〈1〉, . . . , s〈k−1〉 fixed. The first term is continuous because
it is equal to a constant time the maximum of order statistics u〈1〉 and u〈k〉, which are continuous functions
of u. Similarly, each term of the summation is a constant times the maximum of a continuous expression
and zero. 
We can now establish that the MILP model (30) is correct.
Proof of Theorem 10. We first show that given any (u, zk) that is feasible for (13), where uij = u¯ij for
j = 1, . . . , k − 1, there exist v, δ, , w, σ for which (u, zk,v, δ, , w, σ) is feasible for (30). Constraint (30j)
follows directly from (13c). To satisfy the remaining constraints in (30), we assign values to v, δ, , w, σ
as in (15), where κ is an arbitrarily chosen index in Ik such that uκ = u〈k〉. It is easily checked that
these assignments satisfy constraints (30b)–(30h). They satisfy (30i) because (13b) implies that uκ ≥ u¯ik−1 .
To show they satisfy (30a), we note that (30a) is implied by (13a) because min{u¯i1 + ∆, uκ} ≤ σ and
(ui − u¯i1 −∆)+ ≤ vi for i ∈ Ik. Since (13a) is satisfied by (u, z), it follows that (30a) is satisfied by (15).
For the converse, we show that for any (u, zk,v, δ, , w, σ) that satisfies (30), (u, zk) satisfies (13). Con-
straint (13b) follows from (14f) and (14i), and (13c) is identical to (30j). To verify that (13a) is satisfied,
we let κ be the index for which κ = 1, which is unique due to (30g). It suffices to show that (30a) implies
(13a) when the remaining constraints of (30) are satisfied. For this it suffices to show that
σ ≤ min{u¯i1 + ∆, uκ} (50)
vi ≤ (ui − u¯i1 −∆)+, i ∈ Ik (51)
(50) follows from (d), (e), and (f) of (30). (51) follows from (b) and (c) of (30). This proves the theorem. 
Finally, we show that (31)–(32) are valid inequalities for the group version of P ′k for k ≥ 2.
Proof of Theorem 12. It suffices to show that for any (u, zk,v, δ, , w) that satisfies (30), where uij = u¯ij
for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, the vector u satisfies (18) and (19). Since we know from Theorem 10 that u is feasible
in (29), it suffices to show that (29) implies (31) and (32). To derive (31), we write (29a) as
zk ≤
∑
i∈Ik
si
(
min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆)+
)
(52)
For any term i in the summation, we consider two cases. If ui ≤ u¯i1 + ∆, then u〈k〉 ≤ u¯i1 + ∆ (because
u〈k〉 ≤ ui), and the term reduces to siu〈k〉. If ui > u¯i1 + ∆, term i becomes
si
(
min{u¯i1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ (ui − u¯i1 −∆)
)
= si
(
min{0, u〈k〉 − u¯i1 −∆}+ ui
)
≤ siui
In either case, term i is less than or equal to ui, and (31) follows.
To establish (32), it is enough to show that (32) is implied by (29) for each i ∈ Ik. We consider the same
two cases as before.
Case 1: ui − u¯i1 ≤ ∆, which implies u〈k〉 − u¯i1 ≤ ∆. Since u satisfies (29a), we have
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)
u〈k〉 +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
sj(uj − u¯i1 −∆) (53)
It suffices to show that this implies
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)
ui + β
( ∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1≤∆
sj(uj − u¯ik−1) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
sj(uj − u¯ik−1)
)
, (54)
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because (54) is equivalent to the desired inequality (32). But (53) implies (54) because u〈k〉 ≤ ui by definition
of u〈k〉, uj − u¯ik−1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Ik due to (29b), and (36) for all j ∈ Ik.
Case 2: ui − u¯i1 > ∆. It again suffices to show that (29) implies (54). Due to the case hypothesis, we
have from (29a) that
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)
min{u¯1 + ∆, u〈k〉}+ si(ui − u¯i1 −∆) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
sj(uj − u¯i1 −∆)
This can be written
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)
ui −
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)(
ui −min{u¯1 + ∆, u〈k〉}
)
+ si(ui − u¯i1 −∆) +
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
sj(uj − u¯i1 −∆)
which can be written
zk ≤
(∑
j∈Ik
sj
)
ui−
(∑
j∈Ik\{i}
sj
)(
ui−min{u¯1 +∆, u〈k〉}
)
−si
(
u¯1 +∆−min{u¯1 +∆, u〈k〉}
)
+
∑
j∈Ik\{i}
uj−u¯i1>∆
sj(uj− u¯i1−∆)
(55)
The second term is nonpositive because ui > u¯1 + ∆ by the case hypothesis, and ui ≥ u〈k〉. The third term
is clearly nonpositive. Thus (55) implies (54) because uj − u¯ik−1 ≥ 0 and (23) holds for j ∈ Ik as before. 
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